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1 he communist systems h2.d 2.na character: the nomenklatura 
system. party committee had a document called 'cadre jurisdictional iist' containing 
a set of positions of different organisations from social, political, economic, cultural areas. 
According to theSe lists the party committees had :eight to appoint the nominees to the 
positions. In every 3-4 years the Central Committee ar:cepted a resolution about these 
lists. The paper examines the phenomenon of the nomenklatura system based on the 
party resolutions. 
Keywords: political sociology, nomenklatura, social structure, political structure. 
An important constituent of the communist (bolshevik) system was the 
nomenklatura. As in many other cases the term nomenklatura is used by 
researchers of the area in different meanings. 1 In what follows we also give 
an interpretation of the term.2 Instead of giving a theoretical or histori-
cal background as an introduction, we present our definition of the term: 
nomenklatura system is the comprehensive system of appointing (evaluat-
ing) jurisdictions of party organs on different levels. Let us see what we 
should know about this phenomenon! 
The nomenklatura resolution includes certain jurisdictions. It defines 
somebody's right against somebody else, that means it defines one-way 
relationship between actors of a social relationship. In what follows it seems 
to be wise to separate analytically the different types of actors (appointer, 
appointee) and their relation. This is important because with time the 
content of the nomenklatura resolutions changed, the range of actors was 
broadened or narrowed. 
The Content of Cadre Jurisdiction 
Let us begin with a more thorough analysis of the actors (i.e. the ap-
pointer and the appointee)! Relying on the resolution we have to make 
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clear what is the content of the different kinds of jurisdiction, what is 
the basis of their different types and what is the legitimation need behind 
them. N omenklatura resolutions generally did not publish the content of 
cadre jurisdiction. This is true especially for the fifties. As we know, pre-
cise enumeration of these jurisdictions was first included in the 1977 and 
1981 resolutions. As a point of departure let us quote the relevant pas-
sage from the 1977 resolution: 'Cadre jurisdiction includes the following 
personal matters: 
appointment (election), promotion, transfer, dismissal, replacement, 
calling back, transfer to a lower post; 
rating; 
government distinction; 
sending to high-level political or state school; 
longer official trip abroad; 
authorization of a disciplinary procedure.,3 
If we look at the nomenklatura resolutions more closely, we find 
lU them other authorizations, in addition to those listed. An ex-
ample is the fact that members of different organs could travel 
abroad only with the permit of the responsible party organ. Another 
'nomenklatura jurisdiction' was (even in the eighties!) the appointment to 
academy correspondent membership, to member of parliament, to the post 
of army general. It would be through 
but instead we assume 
their Wtcfl.'!!j, 
this 
but nevertheless: lU we lose lD]pOI"ta,nt 
;,vhat follows Vie reduce the rUIn.! V"", ]UI"lSd.1CtlOD to ap;pOlntDfleDltj C,,,HDaCK 
and leave out 
'transfer' . 
Peculiarities 
In the v/orid of modern politics 'rve find 
the nomenklatura. 
adheres to some jUTl;3dlctl{)ll 
~traver') and 
one aiso 
and election laid do\vn in the 
constitution. 'The peculiarities of the communist nomenklatura 
systenfl should be determined with this in mind. These peculiarities are 
according to a study Rig by the iO.Uo,w:m/!!;: 
the concentration of important positions in all offi<::ial and 'vol-
untary' organisations in the nomenklatura of party committees; second, the 
inclusion of elective positions (and most of the important ones are elective); 
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and third, the comprehensiveness of the system, which omits no position 
J: "fi .. . ,4 01 any slgml cance In the socIety .... 
In another place he uses the term 5 A similar 
term will be used by us, too, nay it is in our one of the most 
important characteristics of the "'v·~tprn 
In aI)pol.nl;rrle:nt into lea(lerS.h1p 
In former 
the fact pc)l11cic:s sUI~gests the deficiencies this 
In democracies elects its o'tlln 
syste!111 citizens elect the pr~e'1l(1ent 
elect their own leaders. 
P()il.tlcaJ movements and 
If the of elections nrp",,,j,, in practH:e, then the organ-
isation is called 
autocephali.c organisations. 
In modern P()!l1C1C:a.[ sv·sterHS we find several 
If within there are 
which are autonomous and atltlJceI)ha11c, then election and atlt'oc:el)n.aly are 
on one another. In modern political democra.cies there are sev-
eral such the most In'1TIO"rt:'l:Il!t pOlitIcal par-
ties. Relations bet'ween election and altt()cep,h,'lJjr, 
election and rationally-based political system are very in·Hl,n;rt:'ln,t 
ering the above we can safely declare that in modern PCIWclc:al 
r< • , 
vonSIO-
one of the most important principles on which organisations are based is 
election. 
Before analysing the relationship between the communist (bolshevik) 
nomenklatura system and the principle of election it is worth characterizing 
'outside dependence' or heterocephalic organisations. It is evident that it 
is a different kind or dependence (heterocephaly) if only the highest-level 
leader of an organisation is appointed from outside as compared to the 
case when his deputies and other, lower-level leaders also are 'recruited 
from outside'. If we ·vvant to characterize the phenomenon theoretically, we 
have first to introduce - relying on the notion of hierarchical relationships 
within modern organisations - the term level of hierarchy. 
In the following, level of hierarchy of an organisation will be subset of 
the complete and ordered set of positions (and also the people filling these 
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positions) involving similar, prescribed job content and authority (domi-
native) jurisdiction. An organisation is called first-degree heterocephalic if 
people on the first hierarchic level, i.e. the leader (or if the principle of col-
lective leadership is applied, the leaders) are appointed from outside, all the 
others from inside. An organisation is called second-degree heterocephalic 
if people on the second hierarchic level of the organisation, i.e. only the 
leader(s) and his (their) deputies are appointed from outside. Naturally, 
organisations on different levels of heterocephaly can be defined relying on 
the same logic and principles. 
It is evident that the higher the degree of heterocephaly of an organ-
isation the less its autonomy and vice versa.... 'Selecting' from outside is 
in inverse relationship with the autonomy of the organisation. 
The 
and the Eltll]ptyi:ng I:"r:in(:ipJle of 
Collective LE~a(1ej~S.!:llp 
Relying on \vhat had been said in the previous section one can formulate 
an important characteristic of the phenomenon of communist (bolshevik) 
nomenklatura: the nomenklatura system rules out election in the sphere of 
politics and in politically important organisations. 
At this point an important question emerges: how to define politics. 
One can say that political is every action involving appointment by the 
holders of state power. In this sense it depends on the 'conception' of the 
holders of state power which organisations and appointments are political. 
Looking more closely at different political systems, this statement - in our 
opinion - has strong empirical relevance. The exclusivity of the appointing 
principle means, on the other hand, that previously auto cephalic organisa-
tions become he:terocepIlallc, and he:teroceptlalic organ.lS<itlons surVIve 
in social and political life. Although the ruling out of elections concerns 
every organisation, it is worth singling out the problem of elections within 
the communist party. shall return to this later. Another 
important characteristic of the nomenklatura system is that positions im-
portant from the point of vievif of exerting and maintaining political power 
are arranged in one interconnected system. 
Whatever changes have occurred in the system of nomenklatura with 
passing time its essence remained the same since the 'one-way' centraliza-
tion of the political system remained. Only the shape, form and density 
of the nomenklatura net holding organisations in dependence changed but 
the necessity of such a net was never challenged. As we have demonstrated 
earlier, Rigby used for this phenomenon the term mono-organisational soci-
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ety, a term we are wary to take up. We think Rigby's term is inconvenient 
because it suggests a too strong relationship between organisations con-
nected by the nomenklatura - due to the widely held interpretation of 
the term organisation, as if the whole system would be one huge organisa-
tion. But for the description of organisations we use beyond the dimension 
of autocephaly-heterocephaly also the dimension of autonomy-heteronomy, 
and we cannot assume total heteronomy for organisations held in strong 
dependence. Even when was the strongest, organisations had a 
certain autonc'm:Y. 
A better term would be m,onohie]ral:cnlY" but due to the interwoven-
ne ss of and Vile do not deem it convenient either. 
A!th,ough the consisted of one huge network of relations it was not 
hl€;ra,rcilic due to the e:i-dstence of double 
diction. one organisation the internal of appomi;-
ment 'lived alongside' with the or jurisdiction, therefore a 
double appointing jurisdiction existed. Vilhen appointing into a dependent 
post to the the boss had the jurisdiction but 
under the nomenklatura system the organ had 'julnlSdJlC-
Hon', too. 
An acceptable solution might be to introduce a new term. The treat-
ment of the phenomenon of nomenklatura was reduced in the above to 
appointing events. In this respect we used several times the terms auto-
cephalic and heterocephalic. Relying on them, mono cephalic is - in our 
opinion - the best characterization of the nomenklatm:a within political 
organisations. Outside dependence of heterocephalic organisations was ar-
ranged into a chain and thus practically a 'centralized' appointing system 
developed. The nomenklatura system made the appointing principle al-
most exclusive. A different principle was used only at one point: namely 
in the case of those party bosses who operated the whole system. 
In the above we did not differentiate between organisations when in-
vestigating the negligation of election results. But here we should - even 
if cursorily - treat separately the problem of making formal intra-party 
elections. The central slogan of party life was that within the principle 
of democratic centralism democratism means collective decision-making. 
Democratism was identified with one variant of the collective principle and 
implemented accordingly. According to this principle - at least in a for-
mal sense - party leaders could obtain position only through election. It 
would require a separate historical analysis to answer the question how 
leaders could make elections formal. They had to employ several methods 
and techniques for this aim. The most important technique was ruling out 
alternatives, to propose 'one candidate'. 
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The collective principle is not only used in dictatorships. Under the 
system of functionally divided branches of power we find the collective 
principle e.g. in parliamentary representation, in the veto of the president 
of the republic, in the act of signing by the prime minister. Let us also 
mention that making certain elections formal (i.e. without a stake, 'prede-
termined') occurs not only in dictatorships: it may occur in democracies 
too that preliminary agreement makes elections formal (e.g. parliamentary 
voting 'brings' the predetermined result). An important difference in this 
case relative to dictatorships totally neglecting elections is that at least 
once, when electing parliamentary representatives, such manipulation is 
not possible. Another form of the collective principle was realized within 
the nomenklatura system through the 'preliminary agreement right' and 
the 'right to express an opinion'. These techniques became tools of reduc-
ing the concentration of power (on lower levels, of course). 
as a Tool of Control over ;::i{)Cllet;v, 
P atron-Client 
order to operate the nomenklatura system successfully it is also necessary 
that every power in society important from the point of view of political 
activity be attached to 'nomenklatura' positions. In modern societies we 
find several organisations to be independent of the sphere of politics, i.e. 
autonomous or autocephalic. A of social movements, 
economic, cultural, mass communication etc. organisations 
are of this kind. In democracies their number cannot be reduced or can 
be to a small extent. For successful of the nomenklatura 
system, a size', i.e. the smallest possible set of organisations 
is necessary. This economIC Pri-
vate economic nornenklatura ",,,·d."Tn 
their mere existence because their over economic resources 
constitute an source of power in the modern world. For 
the management of the system, this alternative source of power should be 
l.e. the of economy should be politically 'positioned'. 
this re:3pect, nationalization and the collectivization were lIT1T)nrt.ant events 
The same could be said on any other source 
of power. Another characteristic of the system was that different sources of 
power were 'nationalized', i.e. attached to certain positions, which meant 
that every concentration of power outside the nomenklatura Vias ruled out. 
Thereby it became impossible to enforce power outside the system in 
a way transgressing the system.! An important consequence of all this was 
that the system could be 'abolished' only from inside. The nomenklatura 
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system presented above was a strikingly stable political formation. The 
cause is simple: a principle was given whose employment made it possible 
to control political (personal) relations and processes on a large scale. This 
was the principle of 'give him a division and rule over him' ('divisio et 
impera'). This principle was an 'invention' of the communist (bolshevik) 
system. Although the techniques of political personnel changes constitute 
only one factor in political systems, personnel problems are of an 
overriding importance for the nomenklatura sv,;tem. 
Although the did not on rational when rp,nHH'_ 
'ie:aciel:sIl.1p role', the nomenklatura itself to be a rational-
istic and po"werful tool. Naturally enough - like so many overcentralized 
svst,':IrtS - this too was not from above. That 
18 aU.tonc,my of local or,gam"ai;lOns appe:ared w"ithin 
system. it is true that the nomenklatura svst€,m 
embracing network of on 
the system of was new and new re-
lationships appeared at every level. Later within the Kadar system lower 
level party organisations too acquired a kind of autonomy. To prove this 
let us quote from a document whose content might be g,eneTCLll:,:,eu UUU.LLl.t', 
further research. 
'In decisions concerning cadres "within the jurisdiction of ministry and 
national-level party committees (promotion, dismissal, distinction, etc.) 
higher-level party and state organs have to ask for the preliminary opinion 
of the responsible party organ.' 'In matters of appointment and dismissal 
of leaders belonging to the jurisdiction of the Central Committee: 
about appointment and dismissal of ministers, leaders of national 
authorities and deputy ministers, the responsible party comrnittee 
should be informed before execution and publication of the act; 
in the case of appointment and dismissal of deputy leaders of national 
offices, their heads of department and higher posts - if promotion 
is from the local apparatus - the opinion of the responsible par'bJ 
committee should be required before the final decision'. 8 
Changes in the Nomenklatura System 
'We did it so that beforehand we looked at how things were done in the So-
viet Union and other people's republics .... There were one or two speeches 
held in the Soviet Union dealing with this matter. We adhered to these 
principally. Relative to the relationship to the state and the mass move-
ments' relationship to the party we could not find out anything.,9 Knowing 
the peculiarities of the nomenklatura system we cannot avoid the question 
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about the origins of the system. How could come about and consolidate 
such a system? To answer the question of 'why' is simple. As with the whole 
of the communist (bolshevik) political-economic system, we can safely as-
sert here too: since the Hungarian Communist Party owed its power to the 
Soviets, it implemented - relying on the Soviet example, if not directly 
urged by the Soviets - this power tool in Hungary, too. The 'confession' 
of the motto is lovely but it does not change anything in the essence. The 
empire introduced its own system in its provinces. 
As to the question of 'how', i.e. the Hungarian specialities of the 
nomenklatura system we can say similar things as Rigby said on the origin 
of the Soviet nomenklatura. 10 Between early 1947 and early 1949 in political 
power struggles the communist party 'liquidated' all its political opponents. 
The first but we can safely say decisive 'slice' in this salawi tactics was 
Bela the first secretary of the Smallholder Party at that time, 
and detention was the last. During the process the 
communists took over the control over organisations and over 
political and state administration (let us mention the struggle for the 
the borderguard, the of the interior or the B-lists and the 
process against the . When the pmver struggle waB 
over and the apparatus excellence political organisations 
for the introduction of the nomenklatura system. 
nc,c,~s'3arily the reinforcement of the """1-,,",, economic and 
administrative P()SltH)ns. This was done e::;::;eHLldllY "\~Tith the nationalization 
::JI>flng of 1949. Afterwards 
so that mtr,3,Dar 
III 1948-49 and the 'DeODle 
had to be 
elections become Therefore the )revolution had to consume 
its children~. a 'suitable' 
party had be c:reated. This last step vvas made in 
structure for the 
and since that 









existence is still not 
dOCUil1ented therefore ',,"le do not knO'l{ its content. 'Tvvo drafts vy"ere pre-
pared for this session as it turns out from vlhat !ol101Ns: pro-
fessors did not belong ".rlV'Hr-!p,-P Iil the first list, vvhile in the second one) 
the most persons 
"- -,... t'"- ,13· to [,he ;:;ecre anal. 
to the the less ones 
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In the debate the most important problem proved to be the rela-
tionship between the center, the 'county-level committees' and the state 
apparatus. The problem of the repressive apparatus was also hinted at. 
Finally, the resolution of the Secretariat contained that: 'the Secretariat 
in principle agrees with the suggestion as a point of suggests 
to find out hov,r this was solved in the Union.'14 
In October-November of 1949 a was sent to the Soviet 
Let me out two elements from the vast 
on one it examined thoroughly 
of the SO'v-iet 
On the 
nomenklatura sv,;tem. ttE;tulrnLing home and 
based on the These motions 
"tNere pres<:nt;ed to the Secretariat in. the ::J]:)nng of 1950. 10 It cannot be 
chance that on two consecutive sessions on 22. and 29. of March 1950 the 
Secretariat resolutions the reform of the central 
J h . t' J:: • ., d 16 apparatus anu t __ e reorgamsa lOn 01 work vnth ca res.-
of those concerned and those making the suggestion is 
the fact that right at the top of the report of the to the 
Union we can read a remark pinpointing the most important element of 
the nomenklatura system: 
'The Party directs government organs first of all through communists 
sitting in main posts of state administration; the key positions of state ad-
ministration are filled according to the decisions of leading party organs. ,17 
The suggested and adopted system proved to be durable. After the 
March 1950 resolution the nomenklatura system remained essentially intact 
until the disintegration of the system in 1989. Although the core of the 
nomenklatura system remained intact between 1950 and 1989 we can reveal 
certain modifications if we analyse the history of the system closely, small 
departures from the original pattern and the previous practice. On one 
hand, the 'regulation' of the system was gradually formalized, on the other, 
the structure of positions 'covered' continuously changed. 
One of the most important elements of change within the history of 
the nomenklatura system was the change in the role of 'CC organs' and 
actors with jurisdiction. In the Rakosi era only leading party organs were 
given cadre jurisdiction, thus the Political Committee, the Secretariat and 
the Organisational Bureau (OB) - until it was abolished. The Central 
Committee had no separate cadre list although it interfered with cadre 
problems in the name of the PB, the Secretariat and the OB. 
After 1956 the previous system prevailed for 6-7 years, i.e. cadre ju-
risdiction had the Central Committee, the Political Committee, the newly 
created and short-lived Organisational Bureau, later its successor the Sec-
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retariat.The only change was that from that time the Central Committee 
>,,,,,d an 'own' list too. 
Although the 1962 nomenklatura resolution does not show any change, 
in tl'e documents of motions we find a new element. The reduction of cen-
tral :ists could be attained - at least partially - through transferring 
some positions 'for approval to the responsible secretary of the Central 
Committee' .18 Let us stress again that this was not included in the nomen-
klatura resolution but this too came very soon. In the next nomenklatura 
resolution the own jurisdiction of CC secretaries and CC heads of depart-
ment was explicitly mentioned. '... in order to speed up appointments 
and approvals, ... ( CC) has transferred '" the leaders of government organs 
and party organs before appointing, dismissing, transferring, honoring or 
letting to travel abroad to the jurisdiction of the secretaries and heads of 
department of the Central Committee, cadres belonging to the jurisdiction 
of the Central Committee have to ask the permission of the responsible 
secretary or head of department of the Central Comro..ittee. If divergence 
• ... h th St' ,19 01 oplnlOn anses, one _ as to turn to __ e ecre anat. -
Although the last passage of the quotat:on suggests that secretaries 
and heads of department had a jurisdiction 'shared' with the Secretariat 
l]lle think that theirs was a true, classical jurisdiction. Our opinion is cor-
roborated by the fact that in the text of the resolution positions were listed 
as items belonging to the jurisdiction of secretaries and heads of depart-
and our standpoint is further reinforced if we take into account the 
CDar:tg"s rdative to the jurisdiction of secretaries and heads of department. 
Next time in 1967: 'Political Committee modified the jurisdiction of CC 
secretaries and heads of rip·n~irt.m'~nt. to the extent that perS()llllle! matters 
persons under their lUlLlScil(:tlon 
be introduced to re13p'Onsir)le 
bodies Yiith their prelim:mcu 
apjOOl:ntnllent, tlran.ster, dlsrrnss:al) could 
or mass or:ganil;al;ion or state 
In the draft of the resoiution we 
''''>'1'",·l-n1 one can avoid that decisions of lo"vver-level mass move-
ment or state bodies could be by one person. 
In the documents vve find the formulation that the prelimilll<lxy consent 
secretaries and heads of department is necessary in perS()U11e! 
relation to the above mentioned The cadre iurisdidi.on was there-
among secretaries, heads of department and the leaders of other 
re:sponSH)le organs and organisations. A kind of collective prin-
applied in this area. The fact that the 1967, the 1968 and the 
1971 resolutions on cadre lists did not mention who could decide in dis-
puted matters suggests that in final account the secretaries and the heads 
of were de facto in power position. This feeling is corroborated 
the further events. The Central Committee on its 28. November 1973 
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session abolished the cadre jurisdiction of CC secretaries and CC heads of 
department. 22 This means that the previous situation was qualified even 
by parry documents as cadre jurisdiction. This becomes even more clear if 
we take into account that in 1974 this personnel jurisdiction was replaced 
by the right of preliminary agreement: 'Before the decision of the respon-
sible organ one should obtain the agreement of the responsible secretary or 
head of department of the Central Committee on behalf of the 
S-C-C.!---l·a.!..- ,23 t ret;a,i_ b.n 
V/hat is the difference betvleen the tVIO ]UrlS:d1ctJlOliS (personnel 
rea.dU:lg the two qu,otc"ti(}ns 
below: 'The list of functions swbl<,ct to does not 
define cadre JurlE,dl.ctl01J.: 
other jUlrls,::!ictiocn 
education - should not be ~~~."_~" to it ... ,24 'If d1Jln:ng checlil:ng up 
a difference arises bet\veen heads of rlpn'::>:Ff.ml~nt. and 
appc,in·tin.g org,:1n!>, the motion should be pr'esE:nted 
CC Secretariat. Whereas relative to sec-
retaries and CC heads of department had positive - even if restricted 
- rights, with the introduction of the a 
delaying but no means exclusive veto right wa.s left with secre-
taries and heads of department. It wa~ not even a true right of veto 
since the final word was with the Secretariat. A further weakening 
of the power position of secretaries and heads of department (or at 
least the intention to weaken them) is signalled by the fad that from 
this time this list of posts liable to preliminary agreement became a 
separate list of the secretary and the head of in contrast 
to the previous situation when secretaries and heads of department 
had separate lists. Further - and more radical - changes occurred 
in the second half of the eighties. In 1985 the preliminary agreement 
right of secretariat as a body was abolished, its 'nomenklatura' right 
has disappeared too. At the end of 1989 the whole system ceased to 
exist. 
The Number of Nomenklatura Positions 
The number of positions included in individual nomenklatura lists can only 
be estimated but not given accurately. Data can be gained not from nomen-
klatura resolutions but from different motions. The reason is simple: the 
number of institutions and positions included in the list was not indicated. 
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We cannot know directly how many heads of department were in the min-
istry. In order to obtain exact figures we ought to perform a full 'history 
of institutions' analysis of the period. 
But taking into account the well-known data it can be revealed that 
with time the number of posts included in central cadre lists decreased 
(from 3500-4000 in the fifties to 450 in 1988). Although the data are not 
conclusive we can state that on the long run the number of positions in the 
nomenklatura system decreased, first of all, in the eighties. 
Naturally, we have even less data on the whole system of nomen-
klatura, the total set of positions from those in the CC cadre lists to those 
in primary organisation veto lists. A report of Party and Mass Movement 
Department from 1975 is telling in this respect. 26 According to it in 1971 
there Vlere 89,000 positions on the cadre lists of party comrrittees and party 
lea.derships and 81,000 in 1975. Within the veto right of primary organi-
sations there were 280,000 positions overall in 1975 - after a reduction of 
20%. 
Noruenldatura Inap 
In the above we analysed positions on the nomenklatura according to their 
formal characteristics only. It would be interesting to look at the changing 
place of a position within the list, the changing structure of the list. For 
want of a computerized data base we can investigate only individual po-
sitions, their 'rows', and have to concentrate on one or two nomenklatura 
levels. vVhat follows is much more an interesting anecdote than a serious 
analysis. 
r1(-" . . d' t' ('" 
'vv s Juns lC -lon nrst 
tiIlLdlng is tha,t in the 
changed. 
U-HH.c"",,-,,, of posts belonging to the 
1963-1988). The first interesting 
III the 
The Central Committee elected (according to the party rules) the 
members of the the CC secretaries and since the seventies the presi-
dents of standing committees (e.g. Propaganda CC heads of 
department, the chief editor of Nepszabadsag, the rector of the College for 
Politics (previously the director of the Party College), the chief director 
(previously the director) of the Institute for Social Sciences, the director 
of the Institute for Party History, the president of the Editorial Board of 
Tarsadalmi Szemle, and the managing editor of Partelet Viere all the time 
on the list of the CC. These were the most important party posts and 
their importance was best expressed by including them in the CC (i.e. the 
highest level) cadre list. 
CADRE ROTATION 145 
In the third larger bloc of CC cadres we find the first secretary of 
the Budapest Party Committee, the president of Parliament (P) and his 
deputies, the president of the Presidential Council (PC), his deputies (the 
latter only till 1985), the chairman of the Council of Ministers (CM), his 
deputies and its other members, the president of the Supreme Court (SO), 
the Highest Prosecutor (HP), the president of the Council of the 
president and chief the 
first secr'et;aJry of the Communist Youth !.J,oCLglLe._ 
secretary of the National Council 
commander of the vVorkers' 
organs of state administration 
the leader of the n,~"h;';" 
1n 1963 the of 
the chief 
of llrts 
of the of V/omen and po-
lltlcal chief of the of the of Defence Viere included in 
but from 1967 
\vas until 1981 In 
and the chief s€:CI'ei;a;ry 
of NatioI:.al 
pI·e~31(ieD.t and chief secI'ei;aJrv 
'interest groups of social movements' were left 
for one [term' of the 
in Parliament on the list~ Its short tenure can be 
that at that time a 'constitutionaP drive 
mention that on cen-
the hierarchical level in the 
said orgamsatlOns. 
On the second level jurisdiction) are similar in structure 
to those of the CC list. Generalizing somewhat one can say that on PB list 
we find the second level of the central party (CC apparatus, 
press, party institutions), the second hierarchic level of 'outside organisa-
tions' figuring already on the CC list, and first hierarchic level of some 
up to then 'freelance' organisations. of the former are: 
presidents and secretaries of NCTU, second men of ministries (sometimes 
fi 'd ,-' r '-h .. J.. t.c .1..') '-Lrst epUules or u __ e IDlnlSGer, s"aLe secreuanes euc. 
Examples of the latter are: the leadership of leaders of national 
organs, county level party and state leaders (county level first secretaries, 
local council presidents). It is no wonder th"1t foreign affairs and defence 
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have a special position in this system. One of its signs is that the third 
hierarchic level of these areas is also included in the PB list: political 
commissars of repressive organisations (political heads of department of 
the ministry of interior and the national army), generals, ambassadors. 
With positions on the third (Secretariat) level the principles are the same 
a.s presented above. Further ties downwards where ties on higher levels 
already exist and new ties where they did not exist previously. Third level 
of ties with ministries (jurisdiction over deputy ministers), a further tie with 
the army (deputies of political heads of department, army commanders etc.) 
but instead of enumerating further examples let us formulate a statement 
on the Kadar era. Although central nomenklatura are central in the sense 
that they define the cadre jurisdiction of the highest party organs, the 
'~entralization principle' ha.s another meaning too: central nomenklatura 
include only positions of national central organs (in the Kadar era). 
It is worth somewhat about this statement! In the Kadar 
era it might happen even with high priority cities that the level of city 
party committees was tied too, but with other organisations and positions 
there was a limited, peculiar regional decentralization: county level lead-
ership was dependent in its appointment on the central nomenklatura but 
otherwise it was free in its personnel policy within the county. This was 
not so in the Rakosi era! In central nomenklatury of the fifties we find 
many county-level posts which were later transferred to the jurisdiction of 
the county-level (e.g. secretaries of district-level party committees, county-
level secretaries of NCTU, full-time secretaries of cities, county-level sec-
retaries of NCC, members of the executive committee of councils 
etc.). The positions included in county leadership changed in the Kadar-
era too, but the set wa.s not too large even at the beginning (first se,::rf:ta.ry 
secretaries, council presidents, chief editors of papers, county-level 
police county-level highest prosecutor, county-level chief 
the el~;l.1'tles pOlnted toviards decentralisation. 
posts of large firms, and state 
farms were more centralized (they were not entirely in the hands of county-
level leadership) but counties still had enough posts in their jurisdiction. 
We cannot make a large mistake saying that vertical (regional) sharing of 
power had an important role in the system. 
in of Institutions 
Previously we assumed that the overall number of positions included in 
the nomenklatura system had diminished. We can also safely assume that 
by 'shortening' of the central lists, the jurisdiction of lower level party or-
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gans partly increased (through the decentralization of jurisdiction of higher 
organs) and partly decreased (by further decentralization and by the 're-
duction' of the whole system). Decentralization cannot be understood as if 
lower (regional) party organs would obtain jurisdiction over positions left 
out from the central list. This certainly might happen, e.g. when the center 
'passed' a regional position to lower-level party organs (e.g. the position of 
the secretary of the executive committee of the county council was 'given' 
by CC to the county-level party committee). Vie shall call this phenomenon 
regional decentralization. Another form of decentralization might be when 
the center gave some central (national) positions to a national organisation 
that previously had only formal jurisdiction over it (functional decentral-
ization). Such events did not touch the life and jurisdiction of n::l:;lC'llcH 
organs. 
We cannot go into the details of this problem since we do not know 
anything concrete for want of documents on nomenklatura rights of lower 
level party organs. Of course, we can formulate some statements and hy-
potheses relying on existing data. For the level of primary organisations 
we can assume that both in the Rakosi and in the early Kadar era primary 
organisations could not have true cadre jurisdiction (beyond the right of 
expressing an opinion). If our assumption is right, we can state that the 
introduction of the right of expressing opinion - probably in the sixties -
weakened the nomenklatura network on the level of primary organisations. 
Relying on the term introduced above we can divide the history of 
central cadre lists into subperiods. First there was the 'nomenklatura jun-
gle' characterized by high-level heterocephaly of organisations or, to put it 
otherwise, a dense 'party network' around political, social, economic and 
cultural life. This period too had its regularities: the intention was dis-
cernible that an organisation (e.g. a ministry) was 'controlled by the party' 
through inclusion of the minister in the cadre list of the CC, the secretary 
of state in the list of PB, the deputy minister in the list of the Secretariat, 
in the list of the head of department, secretary of CC, etc. (Departing from 
this one could investigate whether this pattern was general, i.e. whether 
different hierarchical levels of an institution were put on cadre lists of dif-
ferent party organs). 
The first type of change within this system was that nomenklatura 
rights were pushed downwards (regional decentralization). This might be 
the case when a ministry head of department was transferred from the CC 
list to the list of the Budapest party committee. (For want of documents we 
have to use the conditional. We have already hinted at the methodological 
problem that we do not have regional lists). 
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The other type of changes was the reduction of 'party ties' of given 
organisations. Such an instance is the disappearance of ministry heads of 
departments from all (!) the lists. 
The last phase - still belonging to the nomenklatura system - of this 
series of changes is naturally first degree party heterocephaly, i.e. primal 
party ties. Concerning individual organisations (and not the whole system) 
the most radical change was the abolition of every 'party tie'. This could 
happen by: 
a) giving back the right of appointment to the organisation (if it was 
'originally' heterocephalic): e.g. the leader of a large firm or a national 
daily with nationwide circulation; 
b) the right of election was given back (if 'originally' the institution was 
autocephalic): e.g. the president of the Association of Writers. 
To avoid any misunderstanding let us stress that in this phase sev-
eral organisations remained under party's jurisdiction, only individual (less 
institutions were exempted. The disintegration of the nomen-
klatura system occurred when the nomenklatura right over the most im-
pm'tant organisations - the longest held on the nomenklatura lists - was 
abandoned. At that time everything was for sale. To sum up we can say 
that there was a movement in the system toward organisations with a lower 
level of heterocephaly. 
The Inclusion I'J orm Constraints 
If we look at the h,<:t-,,.,,,,, of the nClWleIIKla1;u:ra, we can say that the arbitrari-
ness, the pressure of the have eased with time even if its essence 
remained unchanged. It would not be convenient to call this process liber-
alization of the system and it could not be called democratization either. 
be Bib6's term dE;Sj:)QltlC concentration 
the process as limitation of the concen-
mentioned already that the communist (bolshevik) 
had relied essentially on the traditional legitimity of bosses. 
At the inception of the communist-bolshevik a traditional despotism 
ny·e\ral1e.o (everything was allowed for there was no normative con-
the concentration of povver V;'ias In the {true' Kacia.r era 
(beginning with 1962-1963) this concentration of power and traditional 
despotism were reduced somewhat. This restriction is not due to the ap-
pearance of some alternative countervailing political po·wer, much fflore to 
normative restrictions against persons and groups in power emerging from 
intra-party fights. The process began in small steps in 1963 and accelerated 
in the seventies and eighties: 
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1. Laying down the content of cadre jurisdiction 
2. Giving formal autonomy 
3. Reduction of individual despotism 
4. The appearance of procedural rules 
5. Cycle prescription 
6. The request of written motions 
7. Prescriptions concerning review of lists 
8. Publicity of nomenklatura resolutions 
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